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Mobilizing islam and custom against
statutory reform: bayt al-tâ‘a in
Yemen
Anna Würth
NOTE DE L'AUTEUR
I would like to thank Yemeni activists for their willingness and time to discuss their
thoughts with me; Baudouin Dupret and Kilian Bälz for their concise comments on earlier
drafts; François Burgat, CEFAS staff and guests for their outstanding hospitality and help
in Sancâ’. I am also indebted to an unnamed friend for clarifications on the dynamics of tâ
ca that are not found in legislation or court judgements. 
1 In August 2000, the Parliamentary Committee for Justice and Awqâf issued its report on
the amendment of Law 28/1992 on Civil Procedure and Execution of Judgements. The
amendments suggested, inter alia,  giving the executing judge (qâdî al-tanfîdh) complete
discretion to force a disobedient wife (zawja nâshiza) back to her husband’s home, thus
adapting the Egyptian model of bayt al-tâca.1Most unlike other recent reforms of Yemeni
family  law (Würth,  2003),  this  draft  caused  an  uproar  among  non-governmental
organizations (NGOs),  which spread to journalists,  lawyers,  some judges and religious
figures, and resulted in the articles in question being dropped from the law. This present
discussion will argue that the NGO campaign was successful because it was based on an
amalgam  of  customary  and  Islamic  norms  in  defense  of  the  legislative  status  quo.
Implicitly, activists of all political shades also argued that the control of paternal relatives
over women correlates to male protection for women in cases of marital conflict and in
the absence of state interference into “family affairs.” 
2 For this article I have relied on newspaper material and interviews with judges, lawyers
and NGO activists. To illustrate current jurisprudence, I have used an arbitrary selection
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of about thirty personal status law rulings issued by the Court of Appeal for Sancâ’ and al-
Jawf,2thus consisting of cases from a rural environment.3These rulings contain appeals to
cases  heard  at  Courts  of  First  Instance  and  to  cases  decided  by  arbitrators  under
customary law. 
 
“Angry” wives 
3 “Running-away  angry”  (hanq)  from  one’s  husband  occurs  frequently  in  Yemen,
particularly among the recently married and those with small children (Mundy, 1995:131,
141 ; Würth, 2000:162-166). Depending on the circumstances, “running-away” might last
for an afternoon, a week, but also months, and some wives spend years living at their
relatives. As this indicates, “running-away angry” is only an option for women who have
relatives  to  turn  to,  and  is  most  feasible  for  those  who  have  family  nearby.4Again,
depending  on  the  individual  family’s  material  and  psychological  circumstances,  the
pressure to return to the husband varies. If a woman has married up the social scale,
some families  fear  social  isolation,  and force  her  to return.  Some force  an unhappy
daughter/sister back, simply because they cannot or do not want to house and feed more
people. One woman recounted to the Court of Appeal: The defendants [her husband and
her father] agreed to submit to arbitration … and agreed secretly among themselves. My
father forced me to return to the defendant [the husband] but life did not improve (wa lâ
fâ’ida). Then I ran away and asked the defendant to divorce me … and he agreed in the
presence  of  the  local  notables  …  but  my  father  forced  me  to return.  And  I  never
experienced  anything  with  the  defendant  [the  husband]  but  insult,  tiring  work,
exhaustion and bad treatment … and [my father] helped him to force me back one time
after the next for five years.5
4 Other families are enraged that the husband appears to have mistreated their female
relative, and refuse to let her go back. While in most cases the wife will have left her
husband’s home because of problems and irritations in the marriage, sometimes marital
trouble is caused by the in-law relationship, particularly if the husband and his in-laws
have had financial dealings outside the marriage. As the husband of the above-mentioned
wife explained: “Her father is the reason for her running away and being disobedient (
sabab fî kharabihâ wa khurûjihâ can tâcatî) and I am having a dispute with him.”(ibid.) Those
conflicts tend to be the most exacerbated: whatever the wife’s personal relations with her
husband, she might find herself  a pawn in an ever broadening circle of conflict,  and
possibly violence. 
5 Overall, how the paternal family reacts towards marital trouble experienced by one of its
female members is as diverse as the reasons for the marital disputes themselves.6
 
On how to return a wife: negotiation, arbitration, and
court proceedings 
6 Whatever the reasons for the wife going back to her relatives’ house, the husband should
approach his  in-laws or send mediators  to start  negotiations about her return.  Most
families  will  insist  on  being  reimbursed  for  the  costs  incurred  during  the  woman’s
residence with her paternal family; some insist in addition on compensation for the wife
(a new set of clothes or gold) and for the in-laws, such as slaughtering a sheep. Families
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may also demand a written statement (iltizâm, tacahhud) from the husband undertaking to
treat his wife decently, particularly if the husband had been violent, overly strict with his
wife, or did not provide for her properly. 
7 Negotiations about a wife’s return can be protracted, thus prolonging her stay at her
father’s house and being a strain on everybody. If mediation does not resolve the conflict,
parties may turn to arbitrators,7often incurring considerable costs and not always being
successful.  All  cases  that  come  to  court  have  therefore  had  a  history  of  informal
negotiations,  mediation  attempts  and  –  depending  on regional  origins  –  arbitration;
accordingly, parties at court will be frustrated and exasperated, but with high hopes that
the court action will effect a decisive change in their favor. 
8 Implicitly,  Yemeni  Personal  Status  Law takes  customary  norms  and  procedures  into
account and does not provide for explicit sanctions should a “disobedient wife,”8as the
legal parlance puts it, fail to return to her husband. Under the law, a wife’s foremost duty
is obedience (tâca), entailing that, with a few exceptions, she cannot leave the marital
home  without  her  husband’s  permission.9If  she  does  so  for  extended  periods  the
husband’s  only  recourse  is  to  suspend  maintenance  by  filing  a  court  action  for  the
restitution of marital rights (tâca, irjâc al-zawja). But even if the court rules in his favor, a
husband has no way of having his wife physically brought back to his house.10Likewise,
Yemeni  wives  have  very  limited  possibilities  of  actually  obtaining  court  ordered
maintenance. Even if a wife’s claim for maintenance is validated by a court ruling, the
decision  remains  largely  symbolic,11since  it  is  not  backed  up  by  the  enforcement
apparatus of the state. Additionally, many, if not most, husbands who are dragged into
courts are too poor to provide adequately for their wives. 
9 Court action is often taken by the runaway wife herself, or rather, by her family, suing for
marital maintenance and the provision of adequate housing. In response, the husband
will often file a counter-claim for marital obedience, or simply respond to his wife’s claim
by denying her entitlement to maintenance.12Regardless of who initiated the proceedings,
judges tend to adjudicate the whole issue in one ruling, that is, the right to maintenance/
housing and the return to the husband. 
10 Husbands will often cite the wife’s paternal relative as at least co-defendant, if not sole
defendant,  and have the claim registered as “wife kidnapping” (nahb al-zawja)  by the
court scribe. This aptly captures the common notion that marital conflicts ultimately
constitute an infringement of men’s rights and should be dealt with as such (Dresch,
1989:56). If the wife is not the defendant, the ultimate decision will involve her only as an
object that her relative has to return to her husband; but many judges will insist that the
wife is actually brought to court and is heard before they issue a ruling. In order to force
the paternal relatives to comply with a decision to return the wife, an insistent husband
might  have  them  temporarily  detained.  The  legal  status  of  this  detention  is  rather
doubtful,  but  is  common  practice  regardless.13If,  on  the  contrary,  the  wife  is  the
defendant, the husband has no possibility of directly enforcing the ruling if the wife and
her family refuse to submit  to the court’s  decision,  and his  only recourse will  be to
suspend her maintenance. 
11 The amendments to the Civil Code of Procedure and Execution of Judgements, detailed
below,  suggested  a  change  to  the  lack  of  direct  enforceability  of  rulings  on  marital
obligations.  If,  after a court ruling,  negotiations between spouses or,  rather,  between
families, about implementing the ruling, came to an impasse, the state would intervene.
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The detention of paternal relatives would be recognized as a legal means of enforcement,
as would a jail term for husbands not paying court-ordered maintenance. A wife could
either be sent to jail or returned to her husband with the assistance of the police. 
 
Jurisprudence: differences and commonalities in
Court and Arbitration rulings 
Keeping the family together 
12 Claims for marital rights, that is, for maintenance/housing and obedience, involve fairly
irreconcilable claims and aims. Husbands demand their wives back without paying for
past maintenance and/or compensation, while wives and their families condition a return
upon fulfillment of these financial requests and the provision of adequate housing.14From
earlier  work  on  court  rulings  in  one  primary  court  in  Sancâ’,  it  appeared  that  First
Instance  Court  judges  very  often  tend  to  sustain  both  claims.  The  wife  is  awarded
maintenance for the time she spent at her father’s house, and her father is obliged to
return her to her husband’s house.15
13 Arbitrators’ rulings are strikingly similar in this respect, as the following few examples
may illustrate. One husband is required to pay YR60.000 (US$400)16to his father-in-law for
the time his wife and children spent at her family’s house, and to provide appropriate
housing for her, far away from her co-wife. Then the wife has to return.17In another case,
arbitrators ruled that: 
Amîra … returns to the house of her husband … as soon as [the husband] pays her
and  her  children  maintenance  for  ten  months,  YR40.000  (US$266),  furnishes  a
house in the spouses’ place of residence … and promises to provide for her and live
with her respectfully. In addition, [the husband] has to offer two sheep to his uncle/
father-in-law, with YR5.000 and another YR5.000 (US$33) for a new set of clothing (
kiswa) for the wife.18
14 In another case, arbitrators failed to find proof of the competing claims, and handed
down the following decision: 
The first party, the husband … has to bring a guarantor (damîn multazim), prepare
proper housing and live respectfully with his wife, and provide for her adequately.
The second party … [the wife’s father], has to bring a guarantor (damîn multazim c
alayh)  and  return  his  daughter  to  her  husband’s  house,  and  oblige  her  to  be
obedient towards her husband.19
15 As these examples show, arbitrators appointed by the parties and state-appointed judges
do not enunciate decidedly different norms. They attempt to keep the nuclear family
together by validating the claims of both spouses, and resort to requesting guarantors to
oblige the husband and the wife’s father to maintain future good behavior. Unlike judges,
arbitrators address in addition the in-law relationship, and may request the husband to
slaughter  sheep  for  his  father-in-law,  “to  pacify”  (tatyîb  khâtir  cammih)  him,  as  it  is
expressed in numerous rulings. Under customary norms, compensation is paid to bring
moral balance back into a relationship that has publicly fallen out of balance; making
amends in this way expresses an apology and an imposition at the same time (Dresch,
1989:50,  56,  58).  Since  relations  between  in-laws  do  not  come  within  the  ambit  of
statutory law to begin with, judges will usually not oblige the husband to compensate his
in-laws.  But  if  there is  a  valid arbitration ruling or  a  previous obligation to provide
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compensation  in  kind  or  money  to  the  in-laws,  many  judges  will  honor  this  and
incorporate it into their own ruling. 
16 While weighing evidence, judges might also consider that slaughtering a sheep for the in-
laws constitutes admission of wrongdoing, an argument refuted by an angry husband in
the following terms: 
The [First  Instance]  judge  made another  mistake  in  arguing that  [the  husband]
slaughtered two sheep for his father-in-law … so he would return his wife … [The
judge considered that] this is evidence that the [husband] committed a mistake. But
this is a faulty argument … since it cannot be considered legally relevant proof (dalîl
min adilla al-ithbât). It is … the curf in Yemen … that one slaughters a sheep for one’s
father-in-law to return [a wife], whether one made a mistake or not.20
17 Customary norms in respect to the in-law relationship thus enter judicial proceedings in
several ways and, in these cases, are often validated by judges. 
 
Legal proceedings 
18 Legal  proceedings before judges and arbitrators  are essentially  the same.  Judges and
arbitrators alike are bound to adjudicate only what was requested by the parties. In both
fora, the plaintiff’s claim and the response of the defendant need to be presented, and
essentially the same rules of evidence apply, i.e. the plaintiff has to prove his/her claim,
preferably by witnesses, which, particularly in family law, is often difficult. Arbitrators
often encounter parties who have no proof for their assertions, but rarely would a judge
express his exasperation in the way that these arbitrators did: 
We requested from each party that they present their claim (dacwâ) and a reply (
ijâba) to the claim of the other side. Then evidence (barâhîn) and witnesses were
requested. Neither of the parties could prove [his claim] with witnesses, and each
side denied what the other side claimed. This went back and forth (wa zâda al-akdh
wa-l-radd) and all [their] claims were just assertions [of the kind] ‘he said and I said,’
which did not deserve that we waste our time with it.21
19 There are, however, essential legal differences between court and arbitration proceedings
that relate to formalization, jurisdiction, and parties’ consent. Unlike arbitration rulings,
court judgements are very formalized, since they go through a lengthy process of claim
reformulation by legal professionals. Thus a claim of “wife-kidnapping” registered by the
plaintiff  with the court  scribe will  eventually be processed into a claim for “return/
obedience of the wife.” Arbitration rulings are much less formalized; although they also
narrow down competing  social  claims  into  adjudicable  facts,  they  lack  the  technical
language and legal reference employed in court rulings. 
20 As to jurisdiction, arbitrators are permitted to rule on all family law matters except for
wife-initiated divorce (faskh), a right reserved to judges alone.22In one case, a husband
turned to the Appeal Court to have an arbitration decision voided, whereas the wife’s
father requested that the ruling be implemented. The Appeal Court voided it, since the
arbitrators had not specified the parties’ claims and had ruled on the “validity of talâq by
the wife” [sic!], in violation of the law on arbitration. In this, as in a comparable case, the
Appeal Court referred the parties to the competent primary court to initiate proceedings.
23
21 Unlike court proceedings, arbitration requires the consent of the parties, often in written
form. The parties need to authorize and empower (tafwîd) the arbitrators to resolve the
conflict on their behalf. It is very rare that a wife authorizes arbitrators herself, or gives
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formal consent (in form of a power of attorney) to a male family member to authorize
arbitration on her behalf. Choosing and authorizing arbitrators is an all-male reserve.
This is a common defense against enforcement of an arbitration verdict.  One woman
appealed  to  the  court  to  void  the  arbitration  ruling  that  had  returned  her  to  her
husband’s home. The Court of Appeal found that her father had failed to obtain her power
of attorney before authorizing arbitration proceedings, and voided the ruling.24In another
appeal on the same grounds, the husband admitted that his wife did not authorize her
father to engage in arbitration: 
The person who authorized (fawwada) [the arbitrators] … was [the person] who has
authority over her (al-qâ’im bi-amrihâ) and [also the one] who is insubordinate and
inciting her (al-mutalâcib wal-mutamarrad lahâ), that is her father and her guardian (
sâhib cismatihâ). Her father is not a stranger to her (laysa bi-ajnabî canhâ) who would
require a power of attorney for arbitration …25
22 Legally,  this  argument  disputes  that  the  arbitrators  had  acted  outside  the  powers
conferred on them. Socially, the husband expressed the customary assumption that the
guardianship by paternal relatives over a woman never ends, and need not be formalized
by a power of attorney, which is seen as a necessity only for “strangers”, that is, lawyers.
In a third case, the Appeal Court voided an arbitration ruling because neither husband
nor wife had authorized the arbitrators  –  their  fathers had done so.26In other cases,
arbitrators had failed to establish a wife’s consent to a divorce that involved giving up her
financial rights vis-à-vis her husband (khulc), thus making the respective ruling amenable
to being quashed on appeal.27
23 To sum up, arbitration and court proceedings differ decisively in legal terms. Whereas the
former  represents  a  judgement  by  a  private  person  based  on  the  parties’  consent,
rendered pursuant to a legally recognized procedure and considered enforceable upon
registration with courts, in the latter, the dispute is solved by a state institution, that is, a
court. Despite this difference, there are essential commonalities between arbitration and
court judgements: in substance, arbitrators and judges attempt to hold the nuclear family
together, and arbitrators also do so by attempting to take the larger social context of the
conflict into account, that is, the in-law relationship in particular. Another commonality
relates  to  the  question  of  a  wife’s  representation  both  in  arbitration  and  court
proceedings. Very often wives are not formally represented, and therefore arbitration
rulings, like many First Instance Court rulings, may be – and often are – quashed on
appeal due to violations of formal requirements in statutory law. 
 
Financial implications: costs of returning a wife and of divorce 
24 A substantive difference between decisions of judges and arbitrators lies in the financial
implications of their rulings. While courts usually do not award monthly maintenance of
more than YR1.000-2.000 (US$6-$12), arbitrators award at least double the amount in cash
and clothes/gold, and also award compensation – cash and sheep – to the in-laws. The
amounts awarded not only reimburse the wife’s paternal family for the costs incurred,
but are of symbolic value to pacify the in-laws. Court-awarded maintenance works the
other way round. It does not cover the costs incurred while the wife was staying with her
family, but is almost entirely symbolic and serves to validate the wife’s claim that she left
the husband’s home for a “proper” sharcî reason, and not because of “disobedience”. 
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25 Considering these differences, a court ruling may be more advantageous to a husband
than arbitration, since it clearly reduces his financial burden for the return of his wife.
One example might illustrate this.  In April  1998,  a young wife,  Amîra,  ran off  to her
father’s house, claiming that she could not stand her husband. The local judge in the
district’s primary court persuaded them to conclude a settlement (sulh), whereupon it
was agreed that the husband should pay YR20.000 (US$133) in past maintenance and that
the wife would return. When this did not happen, the parties resorted to arbitration. The
arbitrators  reached  a  similar  conclusion,  but  requested  the  husband  to  pay  her
maintenance  of  YR40.000  (US$270),  in  addition  to  another YR10.000  (US$67)  for  his
father-in-law and clothes for the wife. Again, he did not pay and the wife did not return.
The Appeal Court – to which the husband then turned to have the sulh negotiated by the
first court implemented – ruled in his favor. Amîra had to return, and was awarded the
YR20.000 in past maintenance that they had originally settled for at the First Instance
Court, and her divorce petition was denied by the Appeal Court.28This train of events
illustrates how the results of the rulings by the two courts were financially much more
advantageous to the husband than the arbitrated solution. 
26 Another substantial difference between arbitration and court rulings relates to the costs
of  divorce  initiated by the wife.  Arbitrators  and judges  alike  are  aware that  marital
disputes on maintenance/obedience very often end up in divorce. Arbitrators are not
permitted to issue any divorce rulings against the wishes of the husband – this being the
courts’ prerogative under the law (see above). The most that arbitrators can do is either
to oversee the repudiation of the wife or lay down conditions for a future khulc. In general,
customary  norms  on  divorce  at  the  wife’s  initiative  almost  always  prescribe  khulc 
settlements,  often for substantial  amounts of money,  as the following examples from
arbitration rulings show. 
27 After having ruled that the wife was to return to her husband upon his fulfillment of her
marital rights, two arbitrators added: 
… if the wife refuses to return to her husband’s house, and requests a divorce (talâq)
then … [her father] has to pay YR250.000 (US$1.667) to the first party [the husband]
… who is  then obliged to divorce [his  wife] and return all  her clothes from his
house. The talâq shall occur after he saw his wife, and requests that she forgives
him… Their girl is to be returned to her father. But if the mother requests custody (
haqq al-wilâya) over the child, she will stay with the mother and … [the mother’s
father] is obliged to pay for her expenses and clothing until she turns major.29
28 In another case, arbitrators first ruled on the return of the wife and payment of past
maintenance, then continued: “Amîra … has no right to maintenance and custody if she
does not step back from her refusal (karâhiya) to return to life in the marital household
under the conditions we specified above, but then she must compensate her husband (tac
wîd) … by YR200.000 (US$1.333) to obtain a divorce.”30A further case came to a Court of
First Instance when a mother sued her ex-husband for child abduction after the divorce,
while  the  husband  claimed  that  custody  of  the  child  was  part  of  a  khulc  settlement
concluded by tribal leaders. The tribal leaders appeared in court and testified that they
had adjudicated the case in 1997, obliging the wife’s family to pay the husband YR240.000
(US$1.600) for the khulc divorce. The First Instance Court found that custody was not part
of the khulc  settlement, whereas the Court of Appeal quashed the ruling, validating the
khulc for the amount specified and for giving up custody of the common child.31
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29 With the rise in the cost of marriage since the mid-1970s, costs for a no-fault, consensual
khulc  divorce have likewise exploded, including not only the sum paid as mahr, but also
part of the wedding expenses and the money paid to the wife’s father (shart). For the rural
and urban poor, the sums usually requested for khulc are clearly beyond their means; even
if there is a margin for negotiation once a family is set on khulc divorce, the amounts are
still high. Therefore many women ultimately turn to the court, where they will have to
prove  their  case,  i.e.  that  the  husband  has  violated  his  marital  obligations  beyond
reconciliation, but the overall expenses for a court divorce (faskh) are significantly less.
For women who can prove their right to a divorce, courts are an important recourse and
more advantageous than arbitration under customary norms.32On the other hand, for
women with social and monetary resources, the khulc mode of divorce, negotiated on their
behalf  by male relatives in an arbitration setting, is  the single most  widespread and
convenient way out of an unhappy marriage – particularly if the husband did not violate
his legal obligations towards her. 
30 To sum up, depending on the case in hand, arbitration rulings offer different advantages
to men and women. If the issue is maintenance for a “runaway” wife, arbitration rulings
are more advantageous to the woman and her family, and often constitute a considerable
financial burden on the husband, because the return of the wife will also require payment
of customary compensation to his in-laws. If the issue is divorce, especially if husbands
have violated their marital obligation, courts offer women a financially more attractive
option, but also the risk of having a divorce petition denied. Formal and informal means
of justice may thus have different effects on litigants, depending on gender, social class,
and the legal issue at hand. 
 
Enforcement 
31 Theoretically, courts and the arbitrators – who are often tribal leaders or local strongmen
– as well as government officials, have access to the same means of enforcement, i.e. to
the government, police or soldiers. In addition, many tribal leaders and local strongmen
command soldiers and prisons of their own and use these powers to intervene in family
conflicts. Thus one husband complained to the Appeal Court that “my cousins forced me (
ghasabûnî) to repudiate my wife,” while the wife’s relatives declared that the husband had
agreed to an arbitrated khulc  divorce for YR80.000 (US$533), of which YR10.000 (US$67)
was paid and YR70.000 (US$467) was recorded as a debt to be paid in one year’s time.
Whereas the First Instance Court in al-Hayma al-Khârijiya had ruled on the validity of the
khulc divorce, the Appeal Court was of a different opinion. They heard the witnesses to the
divorce, who testified that the husband was threatened by a local shaykh and taken to a
separate room “to make him understand that either he divorces, [or] will be beaten up or
jailed.” The husband also presented the order of the local shaykh to have him jailed (
mahbûsiyya) should he continue to refuse to grant the repudiation.33
32 Arbitrators usually fine parties more often than judges, who use this instrument only in
exceptional cases. In one ruling, the arbitrators spelled out that “non-implementation or
procrastination (mumâtila) will be punished with a fine or jail (habîs),” and submitted the
case  to  the  local  security  authorities.34In another  case,  a  First  Instance  judge  had
concluded a settlement before the parties turned to arbitration. The original settlement
required the wife’s father to return the wife to her husband after he had paid YR20.000
(US$133) for her past maintenance. As the husband claimed to have paid his share, and
Mobilizing islam and custom against statutory reform: bayt al-tâ‘a in Yemen
Égypte/Monde arabe, 1 | 2005
8
the wife did not return, the wife’s father was jailed twice. It is not clear from the ruling on
whose  initiative  this  occurred.35In  another  case,  the  wife’s  father  was  likewise  jailed
several times for his refusal to return his daughter to her husband after an arbitration
ruling. The husband had already slaughtered two sheep and then, in exasperation, turned
to local security and shaykhs for help. Ultimately, the wife successfully filed for divorce at
the First Instance Court, and this was upheld at the Appeal Court.36
33 Arbitrators and judges alike confront the problem of enforcement in marital disputes.
Force can only be employed against the wife’s paternal relatives, and not against the wife
herself. Compliance with a court ruling is thus subject to more negotiations between the
families, and rulings serve as a bargaining chip in these processes. Enabling a husband to
return his wife by police enforcement, as the amendments had suggested, would thus
have decisively strengthened the husband’s position vis-à-vis the in-laws and his wife. 
 
Enforcing obedience: law reform 
34 Like most Yemeni legislation from 1990 to 1994, Law No. 28/1992 on Civil Procedure and
Execution  of  Judgements  was  issued  by  presidential  decree  (Würth,  2000:45,  50  ;
Glosemeyer,  1999:82) and acknowledged by parliament only seven years later,  in July
1999.  According to  the preface  of  the draft  law,  parliament  then requested that  the
decree-law they had just passed be retroactively revised. The Committee for Justice and
Awqâf, headed by Abdallah Sinân al-Jalâl,37set to work, relying on the support of some
experts from the Faculty of Law and the Ministry of Justice.38
35 One of the explicit goals in revising the law was to facilitate stricter and more uniform
implementation of rulings,  the lack of which is one of the main shortcomings in the
Yemeni judicial system. To this effect, the power of the executing judge was increased
and, at the same time, provisions for suing judges for, inter alia, corruption, misconduct
and grave professional mistake, were introduced.39
36 In regard to the enforcement of court decisions handed down in maintenance and marital
obedience  suits,  the  draft  deviated  considerably  from  the  current  law  and  practice
outlined above. In general, the draft permitted jailing for civil debts, which was explicitly
forbidden under the previous law (Art. 252b). Article 359 (b) of the draft even permitted
jailing of a debtor’s paternal relatives,  should the debt owed consist  of  maintenance.
Article 358 further stipulated that “[a] claim of poverty is not heard during execution of
judgement … but the debtor has to go to jail until what is owed by virtue of the title (sanad
tanfîdhî) is paid up.” In theory, this would give women the possibility of obtaining a jail
term for those husbands who fail  to pay court-ordered maintenance.  In practice,  the
provision is of uneven application,  depending on the husband’s financial  ability.  In a
parallel fashion, the draft extended the possibilities for a husband to enforce a tâca ruling,
as draft article 371 provided that: “If the object of execution is to move (intiqâl) a wife to
the marital house, the court clerk gives her official notice (ishcâr rasmî). If she fails to
comply, the judge can execute the order by forcing her in a way he finds appropriate as
long as she does not have a sharcî reason.” 
37 The committee  explained this  (and other)  suggestions  in  the relevant  sub chapter  by
claiming lacunae in the existing provisions. These lacunae lead “the courts [to] execute
[judgements] by ijtihâd resulting in differences in legal solutions...” The new provision of
Article 371 would facilitate procedures and stop the arbitrariness (tahakkum) of judges. As
the committee further explained, only if the official notice failed to convince the wife to
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submit to the court ruling could the judge use any means he sees fit – fine her, or use
force  (istikhdâm  quwwa),  that  is,  either  jail  her  or  use  police  force,  or  suspend  her
maintenance.40
38 The draft law failed to detail the technicalities of the official notice. Thus no time period
was set within which the wife was supposed to comply with the notice, leaving it up to
the judge’s discretion. It also failed to provide for precise regulations on how to submit
the notice to the wife; did the rules of summons apply? That is, did it need to be signed
and witnessed upon delivery? And if signed by proxy, would it still obligate the wife,
considering that most young married Yemeni women would not want to be caught dead
conversing with a court usher? 
39 Regardless of the draft’s technical shortcomings, its intention is clear. It aims to provide
both spouses with more state-backed measures and protection to enable the enforcement
of their marital rights as pronounced by court rulings. However, in actual practice the
Egyptian-style innovation would have probably worked more to the advantage of men,
since jail terms for recalcitrant husbands would not have had much effect on the majority
of litigants at Yemeni courts, who do not pay maintenance because of their poverty. 
 
Employing Islam and custom against law reform: the NGOand press
campaign 
40 The news on the impeding change in the law was leaked to the public by Muhammad Nâjîc
Alaw,  a  member  of  parliament,  lawyer  and human rights  activist.41According  to  one
report, cAlaw was in a meeting between some parliamentarians and representatives of the
United Nations Population Fund to discuss the legal position of women in Yemen, when
he broke the news that a “bomb was waiting for women.”42In November 2001, he issued a
press statement in the name of one of his NGOs, and declared the articles to be against the
sharîca.43This argument was taken up by all the other organizations. The Yemeni Women’s
Union in Tacizz and Aden held meetings in which they additionally condemned the draft
as “returning women to Ottoman times (cahd al-harîm).”44The Human Rights Information
and Training Center (HRITC), based in Tacizz, togetherwith the Arabic Sisters’ Forum (
muntadâ al-shaqâ’iq al-carabî), based in Sancâ’ under the energetic Amal Bâshâ, released
similar statements. They added that the articles would contradict Yemen’s international
obligations under the Convention against the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
against  Women  (CEDAW).45The  Civic  Democratic  Initiatives  Support  Foundation  (
mu’assasa dacm al-tawajjuh al-dîmûqrâtî), with its Women’s Affairs Support Center (markaz
li-musânada  qadâyâ  al-mar’a),  were  likewise  active  in  lobbying  against  the  draft’s
provisions, using a combination of all of these arguments.46
41 Among the parties, only the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) issued a statement condemning
the draft as retrograde,47but individual officials of the ruling General People’s Congress
(GPC)  and  the  Islâh  criticised  the  law.  cAbd  al-Fatâh  Butûl  (Islâh)  called  the  draft  a
“dangerous  ijtihâd”,48and  Alî Hamûd  cAzîz  (GPC)  stressed  that  the  Quran  is  usually
interpreted by men, who might have a negative stance towards women. This, in turn,
would result  in provisions “treating women like cattle.”49Long-time GPC Minister  for
Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, Abdallah Ghânim, also criticised the draft and claimed
that the government had no prior knowledge of it. He found that it contradicted “the
principles  of  women’s  rights  and the  principles  of  the  rights  of  the  family,  because
marital  life  can  not  be  imposed  by  force  (cishra  bil-quwwa).”50Ibtihâj  al-Khayba  (GPC)
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stressed that the provision was against the constitution and international conventions,
whereas, interestingly, former YSP member of parliament, Khawla Ahmad Sharaf, pointed
out that it was against the Quran.51
42 Many  perceived  that  these  articles  could  have  only  been  suggested  by  extremely
reactionary members of the religious community. One cartoon published in al-Shûrâ, the
weekly journal of the Union of Popular Forces, showed a woman saying “zahara al-haqq
(the truth appeared)” pointing to a mosque bearing the inscription bayt al-tâca. Similarly,
the late Jâr Allah cUmar, vice-secretary of the YSP, described the draft article as “a simple
provision written by a country-bumpkin jurist while chewing qât (nass basît yaktubuhu
faqîh fil-maqyâl).”52Only Muhammad Nâjî cAlaw pointed out that those who devised the
new provisions appear to have been the experts the committee had relied on. They were
university professors  who had received their  legal  education in Egypt,53and who had
previously been perceived in Yemen as a guarantee of progressiveness in legal and social
thought.54
43 All critics, whatever their political background and convictions, agreed that returning a
wife by force to her husband was against the sharîca, without, however, making further
specifications. Many added that it was therefore also against the constitution, which in
Article 3 required that the sharîca was to be the sole source of all legislation.55 cIzz al-Dîn al-
Asbahî, head of the Tacizz based HRITC, contemplated filing for a constitutional review of
the articles should parliament pass the law.56Some also pointed that all other “Islamic
states” had annulled comparable provisions,  so why should Yemen,  which had never
known  the  institution  of  bayt  al-tâca,  introduce  it?57They  claimed  that  this  type  of
retrograde  legislation  would  ruin  Yemen’s  reputation  as  a  “leading  nation  in  the
codification  of  the  sharîca”,  and  also  cast  doubt  on  the  compatibility  of  Islam  with
international human rights norms.58
44 In another argument, relying more on customary norms, activists were apprehensive that
such  provisions  would  lead  to  criminal  offenses  between  family  members  (probably
having in mind murder by the husband), or to strife between tribes, since, as one activist
mockingly explained: “Hâshid would block all roads to Sancâ’ should the police attempt to
return one of their women to a Bakîl husband.”59In the same vein, YSP member Dhikrâ c
Abbâs reasoned: “What husband will accept, even in a moment of extreme fury (ghadhab)
… such a humiliation (mahâna) for his wife? And will this man also accept this humiliation
for his sister, daughter or mother?”60Another questioned: “Are men in need of the force
of  law and relying on it  to force a wife,  who is  weak (makhlûq dacîf),  to obey him …
Manliness (al-rujûla) is not in need of a law to protect or defend itself.”61
45 Both these  women appealed  to  patriarchal  norms  and conjured  up  an  image  of  the
ultimate loss of manliness: a man, unable to make his wife love and stay with him, has
recourse to the impersonal  nature of  the police to force her back,  instead of  swiftly
acknowledging his failure in marriage and divorcing his wife when she so requests, thus
“respecting himself”,  as the customary parlance describes this  behavior.  The implicit
aspect of this argument relates to the sharcî and to the tribal logic of patriarchy: men’s
control over women becomes unacceptable if not coupled with male protection in times
of conflict. If a woman cannot rely on her family to solve marital disputes, but can be
forced by police to return to her husband despite her wish, then patriarchal control over
women, particularly choosing a spouse for her, is intolerable. 
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46 Lawyers and judges chimed in, with admittedly half-baked legal arguments. Marriage was
a union based on consent, and continuation of marriage without consent would void the
marriage legally and deprive it of its social meaning.62Lawyer Ahmad al-Wâda’î, probably
one of the sharpest legal minds in Sancâ’,  argued that the draft failed to differentiate
between substantive and procedural provisions. The draft authorized the executing judge
to suspend a wife’s maintenance, or, as the explanatory memorandum by the committee
added at some point in the debate (see below), to temporarily suspend her custody (
hadâna)  over her children.63Two prominent judges of the older generation added that
enforcing bayt al-tâca in Yemen did not make sense in terms of substance and procedure,
since it contradicted Article 54 of the family law, allowing a woman to request a divorce
based on “hatred (karâhiya)” for her husband.64
47 After more than three weeks of heated debate, the drafting committee provided a brief
explanatory memorandum on the suggested articles, which was circulated by a number of
newspapers.65The committee explained that Article 371 would offer a legal remedy to a
woman who has been taken hostage by her natal family despite her will to return to her
husband. Therefore, the committee said, “the text gives the executing judge the right to
force the guardian (walî) to implement the ruling on return of the wife – [it applies to] a
case  in  which the  walî  is  the  cause  for  non-implementation [of  the  ruling].”  In  this
interpretation the amendments would legalize current customary practices mentioned
above, that is, sending to jail a walî who refuses to return his daughter to her husband. By
giving this practice a legal basis, the amendments would have extended guardianship in
marriage  considerably,  and  thus  accommodated  customary  understanding  of
guardianship. 
48 If that was the intention of the amendment, one wonders why the drafting committee did
not spell this out in the respective article. In addition, it is doubtful whether a new legal
definition  of  guardianship  over  women  was  indeed  well-placed  in  the  law  on  civil
execution.  The  committee  also  defended  the  draft  by  stressing  that  during  the
proceedings of the initial claim at the competent court, the wife will either have sued for
divorce (talâq lil-darar, faskh lil-caib or khulc lil-karâhiya as the committee specified),66or will
have  agreed  to  return,  if  her  husband  provided  her  with  appropriate  housing  and
maintenance. This way, the committee argued, no wife who was unwilling to live with her
husband would be forced back to him. Here, the committee chose to ignore that under
Yemeni law, suing for a divorce and obtaining a divorce might be two quite different
things. 
49 The explanations submitted by the committee failed to convince the NGO community,
which had decided in the meantime to be on the safe side and submit the issue to the
president instead of waiting for a decision from parliament.67However, there was some
difference about what to request from the president. Sucâd al-cAbsî, head of the Tacizz
branch of the Yemeni Women’s Union, publicly requested that he refer the law to the c
ulamâ’ for an opinion (fatwâ).68Amal Bâshâ, of the Sancâ’-based muntadâ al-shaqâ’iq al-carabî,
could hardly conceal her exasperation. “Leave us alone with the culamâ’,” she claims to
have told her colleague. “If we leave the matter to them, that will bring about an even
greater catastrophe.”69Laywers Muhammad Nâjî cAlaw (Islâh) and Muhammad al-Mikhlâfî
(YSP)  concurred;  requesting  an  opinion from the  fatwâ-council  was  unconstitutional,
since the fatwâ-council had no legislative authority and this might set a double-edged
precedent.70
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50 cAlaw’s criticism was not shared by another Islâh member, cAbd al-Fatâh Butûl,71or by law
graduate and MP Alî Abdallah Abû Hulayka (GPC), who similarly stressed the president’s
prerogative “to refer legislation to any authority.” In his view, the fatwâ-council  was
competent to look into the draft, since “the issue was related to sharîca and fiqh, and not to
the constitution.”72In the end, the president did transfer the law to the fatwâ-council as
had been suggested but – in a very Yemeni move – the fatwâ-council  refrained from
issuing  an  opinion.  Alî  Abdallah  Sâlih  therefore  instructed  parliament  to  annul  the
articles, and the NGO community celebrated a victory. 
51 The united stance of NGOs, lawyers and journalists, irrespective of political affiliations
and  gender,  was  impressive.  Several  factors  may  explain  why  the  campaign  was  so
successful. First, it appears that its success hinged upon framing opposition against the
draft  in  very  broad  normative  terms,  and  that  voicing  opposition  on  grounds  of
constitutional and international norms alone may have not achieved the same result, but
polarized the debate. Second, the debate attracted a large number of urban professional
men, who appear to have felt their personal honor to be at stake, should any of their
female relatives be forced back into an unhappy marriage by force. Another factor for the
campaign’s success may have been that it mobilised an appeal to Islamic and other norms
to keep the status quo – which is probably always an easier campaign to conduct than one
aiming at changing it. If appealing to a very broad, legally unrefined, concept of sharîca was
the common denominator between all groups engaged in the debate, it remains to be
seen whether that same strategy will be turned against them in any following struggle,
particularly about personal status law – but such are the risks of NGO activism. 
 
Conclusion 
52 The first part of this chapter demonstrated that jurisprudence by state-appointed judges
and  party-appointed  arbitrators  in  respect  of  marital  obligations  is  not  markedly
different in underlying norms and aims. Likewise, rulings issued by either of them are an
important part in the process of negotiations between spouses and families in times of
marital conflict. This demonstrates that formal and informal fora of justice cannot be
seen in isolation or as being at loggerheads; rather, they form a normative continuum.
This is even more so when one considers that litigants often take up proceedings in both
fora, simultaneously or consecutively. 
53 Drawing  on  these  findings,  the  second  part  of  this  article  discussed  the  efforts  at
statutory  reform,  aimed  at  providing  both  spouses  with  state-backed  enforcement
mechanisms in respect of marital obligations. These reforms would have partly relieved
litigants of the need to negotiate the terms of marriage with their spouse and, more
importantly, with their in-laws. However, as with other legislative reforms in the realm of
family law, this one may have turned out to benefit men much more than women, since
women’s  rights  to  maintenance  are  mostly  curtailed  by  their  husbands’  poverty.
Furthermore, as the impressive NGO campaign against legal reform demonstrated, the
nature of patriarchy that currently regulates marital conflicts hinges on the lack of direct
state  interference  in  imposing  marital  obligations.  While  this  offers  some space  and
freedom in which to negotiate marital conflicts, it appears to work best for women who
have paternal relatives willing and able to take up their case vis-à-vis a husband in times
of  conflict.  Phrased  differently,  the  question  remains  how  family  law  and  related
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provisions can be reformed to protect  and empower those who are in need of  state
protection, without producing consequences that work only to the advantage of men. 
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NOTES
1. On Egyptian norms and jurisprudence, see al-Bakrî 1994, 696f., 700ff.; Fluehr-Lobban/Bardsley-
Sirois 1990, 41f., 46f. 
2. My thanks to judges Amîn al-Mishwalî and Muhammad Humrân for kindly allowing me to
study these rulings. 
3. The  small  sample  size  leads  me to  use  this  material  in a  purely  illustrative  fashion;  it  is
certainly not a representative or exhaustive treatment of jurisprudence in tâca cases. 
4. During the 1970s, women in rural areas would also turn to local shaykhs or judges. 
5. 31/1422, A.A.H. vs. Kh.A.D., 25. Shacbân 1422, 11.11.2001. All rulings quoted were issued by the
Appeal  Court  for  Sancâ’  and al-Jawf;  the  arbitration  decisions  are  likewise  taken from these
rulings where they are quoted verbatim. 
6. For a contrasting, rather idealized account, see Dorsky 1981:161ff. 
7. Arbitrators are appointed by the parties themselves, and are often tribal or military leaders,
or, more generally, notables of a location, known for their knowledge of legal procedures and
their capacity to force parties to comply with a ruling. Arbitration is regulated under Yemeni
law; rulings by arbitrators are considered as primary court judgements and, after registration at
the  competent  court,  are  subject  to  enforcement  or  appeal:  Presidential  Decree  on  Law  of
Arbitration 22/1992 as amended by Law 32/1994, Articles 54, 56, 58. 
8. The term disobedience (nushûz) does not explicitly feature in Yemeni family law. 
9. I  have  dealt  with  the  doctrinal  development  of  Yemeni  Personal  Status  Law  in  detail
elsewhere, Würth 2000:84-113, particularly 96-99. 
10. Imâm Yahyâ Hamîd al-Dîn, however, had held in his “opinions” (ikhtiyârât) published in 1933
that a “disobedient” wife and/or her guardian could be temporarily jailed for “discipline”, as
could be a husband not willing to pay maintenance. Unlike many of Imâm Yahyâ’s other opinions,
neither of these was incorporated into later family or procedural law. 
11. However, a court order on maintenance that has not been paid up often serves as proof of the
husband’s failure to provide, in wife-initiated divorce proceedings. 
12. According to a 2001 survey in 65 courts, the San câ’-based Women’s Affairs Support Center
found that claims for maintenance were more frequent (41.4%) than those for marital obedience
(17.3%). Women’s Affairs Support Center, no date, 12/13, 23, 26. Unfortunately, the survey did
not specify the maintenance cases in more detail, nor the type of courts they surveyed (primary/
appeal), nor the urban/rural divide in their survey. Data from my earlier research in a Sancâ’
First Instance Court likewise indicate that maintenance claims by women were far more frequent
during the 1980s and early 1990s than suits for restitution of marital rights. Since mostly women
were using the court, this is not really surprising; tâca claims were, however, the most numerous
cases raised by men in front of the court. For details, see Würth 2000:143, 146. 
13. I  have never seen a judge issuing such an order, but witnessed frequently that other law
enforcement  agencies  did.  Judges  confirmed  that  this  is  current  practice  if  the  husband  is
insistent enough and willing to pay. 
14. Adequate housing is an important issue among those recently married, and for women who
have a co-wife/wives. 
15. For data from a Sancâ’ First Instance Court, see Würth 2000, 144, 162-188. 
16. Even though the value of the Yemeni Riyal fluctuated considerably during the past years, I
have calculated on a mean yearly basis of YR150 to the US$. 
17. 23/1419, M.H.Q. vs. H.Gh.H., 8. Rabîca I 1420, 21.6.1999. 
18. 36/1420, Y.A.K. vs. A.A.K., 16. Rajab 1420, 25.10.1999. 
19. Without a no./without a year, S.M.’A. vs. cI.A.S., 18. Shawâl 1420, 24.1.2000. 
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20. 59/1422, M.M.J. vs. H.Q.H., 13. Dhû al-Qacda 1422, 26.1.2002. 
21. Without a no./without a year, S.M.’A. vs. cI.A.S., 18. Shawâl 1420, 24.1.2000. 
22. Law of Arbitration, Article 5 (a) prevents arbitrators to validate a wife-initiated divorce. 
23. 35/1422, Y.A.M. vs. H.H.M., 8. Jumâd I 1422, 28.7.2001; 45/1422, A.cA.M. vs. H.cA.Sh., 6. Jumâd
II 1422, 25.8.2001. 
24. Without a no./1422, M.M.Z. vs. Kh.A.cA., no date. 
25. Without a no./without a year, S.M.’A. vs. ‘I.A.S., 18. Shawâl 1420, 24.1.2000. 
26. 45/1422, A.cA.M. vs. H.cA.Sh., 6. Jumâd II 1422, 25.8.2001; 35/1422, Y.A.M. vs. H.H.M., 8. Jumâd
I 1422, 28.7.2001. 
27. 5/1422, L.cAcA. vs. F.M.Q., 22. Muharram 1422, 16.4.2001. The failure to establish the wife’s
consent for khulc  concluded under customary law is also the subject of many cases brought to
primary courts by women, particularly if the khulc  involved giving up custody; see below and
Würth 2000:227-231 for examples. 
28. 36/1420, Y.A.K. vs. A.A.K., 16. Rajab 1420, 25.10.1999. 
29. Without a no./without a year, S.M.’A. vs. cI.A.S., 18. Shawâl 1420, 24.1.2000. 
30. 36/1420, Y.A.K. vs. A.A.K., 16. Rajab 1420, 25.10.1999. 
31. 2/1421 M.A.J. vs. D.A.H., 22. Rabîca I 1421, 24.6.2000. 
32. It should be added that many women, particularly in urban areas, may have no access or very
limited access to arbitration to begin with. Those include women without male relatives, women
of foreign or binational descent and very poor women. 
33. 1/1422, M.A.M. vs. A.M.Sh., 8. Rabîca I 1422, 30.5.2001. Probably considering that these events
had occurred more than one-and-a half-years ago and the wife had remarried in the mean time,
the Court of Appeal did not void the divorce. They first questioned the wife on whether she
would return to her former husband, which she denied fervently, saying that she hated him.
Then, in a session declared to be the final attempt at a settlement between the couple, the wife’s
family paid the husband another YR100.000 (US$667), which he accepted. The court thus turned a
repudiation under force for  YR10.000 into a  consensual  khulc for  ten times the amount and
validated the divorce.
34. 23/1419, M.H.Q. vs. H.Gh.H., 8.Rabîca I 1420, 21.6.1999. 
35. 36/1420, Y.A.K. vs. A.A.K., 16. Rajab 1420, 25.10.1999. 
36. 59/1422, M.M.J. vs. H.Q.H., 13. Dhû al-Qacda 1422, 26.1.2002. 
37. Abdallah Sinân al-Jalâl (born 1945) ran successfully for Islâh in the 1997 elections in Tacizz; he
has a law degree and used to work as a teacher. 
38. These were Muhammad Ahmad Margham, Professor for Civil  Procedure and President of
Judicial  Inspection  at  the  niyâba,  Dr.  Ibrahim  Muhammad  al-Sharafî,  Professor  for  Civil
Procedure,  and  Sacîd  Khâlid  al-Sharcabî,  Professor  for  Civil  Procedure:  RoY,  Parliamentary
Committee, no date, 5-6. 
39. The respective articles were taken verbatim from the Egyptian Code of Criminal Procedure
13/1968, Art. 494 (1). 
40. RoY, Parliamentary Committee, no date, 242. 
41. Islâh-MP since 1993, rapporteur in the constitutional parliamentary committee. cAlaw also
runs  a  private  law  firm,  and  two  human  rights  NGOs,  “al-Nushatâ’”  and  the  “National
Organisation for Defending Rights and Freedoms” (the groups’ own translation of al-ha’iya al-
wataniyya lil-difâccan al-huqûq wal-hurrîyât al-câmma). 
42. As related in Civic Democratic Initiatives Support Foundation/Women Affairs’ Support Center
2002, 3. 
43. As quoted in “Draft Law allowing the return to bayt al-tâca!”, Al-Qistâs 41, January 2002, 8-9. 
44. Al-Nâs 2 December 2001, al-Wahdawî 11 December 2001, al-Ayyâm 8 January 2002. 
45. For the concluding observations of the CEDAW committee on Yemen’s 1993 and 2002 periodic
reports, see http://www.bayefsky.com/./html/yemen_t4_cedaw.php [24.3.2003]. 
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